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Abstract. This paper is based closely on the author's Y. C. Jao lecture presented to the Hong Kong
Economic Association in November 1998.
Since economic reform began in China two decades ago, the rate of growth in
real output has averaged over 9.5 percent per year. This remarkable
achievement has attracted much attention all over the world. Two conclusions
can be drawn from this experience. First the change from a centrally planned
economy to a more market-oriented economy improves economic efficiency.
Almost all other formerly socialist planned economies have since adopted
market institutions. Second, well-functioning market economies can take
different forms. In many respects China's market economy has its own
characteristics. The fact that it has performed well suggests that different forms
of market institutions may fit different social and economic environments.
Even the developed market economies in different continents are different. By
studying the Chinese economy as an important case we can better understand
the market economy and formulate economic policy.
As the Chinese economic institutions have been evolving, gradually by the
standard of shock therapy but very rapidly as judged by the great adjustments
required for the changes made, the study of the Chinese economy has
emphasized institutional reform rather than economic policy. As the
institutions become more matured and as the financial crisis beginning in
Asia creates serious economic problems for China and the rest of the world, the
study of economic policy in China receives more attention. From the
viewpoints of the Chinese government and observers of China's long-term
development, economic reform still takes priority and serves as the basis on
which economic policies are formulated. This paper will cover three topics:
banking reform and monetary policy; enterprise reform and fiscal policy; and
foreign trade and investment. These are important areas for China's economic
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development in general, and in the context of the current Asian economic
situation. The Chinese government emphasized these areas before and
irrespective of the Asian economic crisis, but has adjusted its policy in the
light of the current situation. I will draw two conclusions at the end of this
paper.
1. BANKING REFORM AND MONETARY POLICY
Before banking reform started in the early 1980s the People's Bank of China
served mainly to issue currency, to accept saving deposits from the public and
to provide credit to state enterprises under the guidance of central planning. In
1983 the People's Bank was officially changed to a central bank but it did not
function as one because commercial banks did not exist. Rather there were four
specialized banks: the Industrial and Commercial Bank, the Agricultural Bank,
the People's Construction Bank and the Bank of China dealing with foreign
transactions. The first three were given some autonomy to extend credit to
state enterprises but were also subject to central government direction and
under local political pressures to do so. As a result excessive expansion of credit
led to inflation in 1985, 1988 and 1993. The chief tool to stop credit expansion
was the imposition of credit quotas. In March and May 1995, respectively, the
People's Congress passed the Law on the People's Bank of China and the
Commercial Bank Law. Both are modern in content, making the People's Bank
a modern central bank and the specialized banks modern commercial banks in
principle, though not in practice as economic institutions do not change by
legislation alone.
To relieve the four state banks from government and political pressure to
extend credits, three policy banks were created in 1994 to provide loans to state
enterprises. These are the State Development Bank, the Agricultural
Development Bank and the Import and Export Bank, which by early 1998
accounted for only about 6 percent of the loans of the big four banks. Since the
early 1990s new commercial banks have also appeared on the scene, taking the
form of corporations each having its shareholders and board of directors.
However, the largest, the Commercial Bank, has only governments at different
levels as shareholders while the others have private enterprises but not
individuals as shareholders. Currently these banks account for about 15±20
percent of loans and 8±10 percent of deposits. These new banks have more
flexibility in decision-making and function more like modern commercial
banks.
Modernization of the Chinese banking system takes time. There are still
political pressures and economic temptation to extend credits at higher risks
than are economically justified. The management and staff still require more
training and experience to operate as modern commercial bankers. Further-
more the four state banks have about 20±25 percent nonperforming loans,
some US$200 billion out of a total of nearly US$1 trillion, as a result of past
obligations to finance state enterprises. About 80 percent of the loans of state
commercial banks consist of loans to state enterprises. To solve these problems
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a number of measures have been taken recently. Local bank managers will be
appointed by the banks' headquarters and not subject to approval of the local
government, and the four state banks will be free from local government
interference in their credit policy. The loan quota system has been abolished
but the state banks are still required to make loans to finance government
investment. The central bank issued a target in 1997 for the state banks to
reduce the percentage of nonperforming loans by 2±3 percent per year in each
of the following seven years. A 270 billion RMP bond issue was planned to
increase the capital±loan ratios of state banks. The People's Bank is to behave
like the US Federal Reserve System, providing closer supervision of the
behavior of the commercial banks.
Under current circumstances how likely is it for problems in the Chinese
banking system to develop into a full-blown crisis? The answer appears to be
very unlikely in spite of the problems and shortcomings of the system just
mentioned. In a market economy with a modern banking system a banking
crisis occurs when many loans become nonperforming. As a result banks do
not have liquidity to pay depositors, and the depositors withdraw their
deposits, further aggravating the liquidity problem. Numerous bad loans
usually result from unprofitable investment in real estate, construction,
infrastructure building, or other major productive activities in an overheated
economy. This is an essential element in the countries experiencing the current
financial crisis in Asia. The Chinese situation is different. Speculative
investments, though existing in real estate markets and in the production of
consumer goods, are less serious and subject to government supervision. More
important, people have confidence in the value of their deposits in the banks
because they believe that the government owns the banks and implicitly
guarantees their deposits. The fact that 20±25 percent of total bank loans are
bad has not affected this confidence and is not likely to lead to large withdraws
of deposits. Given the high savings rate of the Chinese people and the limited
alternatives for their savings, in the last decade the ratio of saving deposits to
GDP in China has been rising. Personal bank deposits increased by 23 percent
in 1997, though at the lowest rate in a decade partly because other forms of
liquid assets have become available. Improvement in liquidity in the banking
sector is further evidenced by the reduction of its loans-to-deposits ratio from
200 percent in 1991 to 140 percent in 1998.
Two other elements which have contributed to the financial crisis in South
East Asia are absent in China. Much larger percentages of foreign investments
in countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were portfolio or financial
in nature. Foreign investors could, and did, withdraw their money quickly
when investment opportunities appeared unfavorable. Most foreign invest-
ments in China, on the other hand, take the form of direct investment.
Furthermore, capital flows in and out of China are restricted. Secondly
governments in Thailand and Indonesia maintained exchange rates which
overvalued their own currencies before the crisis occurred. The central bank of
Thailand also covered up the loss of a large amount of foreign reserve to
support the Thai currency by selling dollars in the futures market. Once the
CHINA'S ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE CURRENT ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 99
# Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000/3d/journals/per/5-1/s165/s165.3d
loss of foreign reserves and overvaluation of the Thai baht were recognized by
investors, the risks of their investments became apparent and they withdrew
their money swiftly, leading to a sharp devaluation of the Thai baht. I should
also mention that China's financial affairs are managed by very able people.
The skill and experience of Premier Zhu Rongji and central bank president Dai
Xianglong in dealing with a possible financial crisis make it even more unlikely
to occur, barring unforeseen developments.
Concerning monetary policy, recall the two major policy objectives
announced by Premier Zhu in March when he took office, fully recognizing
the ``formidable challenges due to the financial crisis in Southeast Asia,''
namely to maintain a real growth rate at 8 percent or more in 1998 and an
inflation rate of not more than 3 percent. As central bank president and Vice
Premier, Zhu Rongji deserved much credit in reducing the rate of inflation in
China from 24 percent in 1994 to 0.8 percent in 1997 and to almost zero in 1998
by reducing the rate of growth in money supply. Realizing the need to
stimulate the economy he is now prepared to raise the inflation rate to 3
percent by adopting a more expansionary monetary policy. By September 1998
currency in circulation in China reached 10 trillion RMB, an increase of 16
percent from a year earlier. Total credit also increased by 17 percent in the
same period. Since inflation has slowed down, nominal interest rates have
come down. In March 1998 the one-year deposit rate went down to 5.2 percent
and the one-year official lending rate to 7.9 percent. Commercial banks are
allowed to set their lending rates within a fairly narrow range, which is between
10 percent below and 20 percent above the official lending rate. One problem in
monetary policy yet to be resolved is the simultaneous control of interest rates
on loans and on deposits, often leading to insufficient profit margins for
commercial banks. These rates should be market determined to a larger extent
than as practiced in China. This problem is recognized by the People's Bank
and the deregulation of interest rates is taking place gradually. As pointed out
before, new commercial banks have appeared to compete with the state banks
to some extent. This is an encouraging development but the new banks as well
as the state banks need to be adequately monitored to prevent them from being
financially irresponsible.
2. REFORM OF STATE ENTERPRISES AND FISCAL POLICY
In his report to the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
September 1997, General Secretary Jiang Zemin devoted section V to
Economic Restructuring and Economic Development Strategy, stating in part:
The state-owned sector must take up a dominant position in major industries and
key areas ... but in other areas, efforts should be made to reorganize assets. We
should support, encourage and help diverse forms of collective economy ... in their
development .... Public ownership can and should take multiple forms ....Now
there have appeared a large number of diverse forms of joint stock cooperative
ventures in the urban and rural areas .... Manage well large enterprises while
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relaxing control over small ones .... We should encourage mergers, standardize
bankruptcy procedures, divert laid-off workers, increase efficiency by downsizing
staff and encourage reemployment projects .... The Party and the government ...
will help them with their welfare, organize job training, open up new avenues of
employment .... We shall build a social security system, introducing old-age
pensions and a medical insurance system ... and improve the unemployment
insurance and social relief systems. Establish public accumulation of funds for
urban housing and accelerate the reform of the housing system.
There are four types of enterprises in China: state-owned, collective,
individual-owned and overseas-funded. The state-owned sector has declined in
importance steadily since the early 1980s. It accounted for only 39 percent of
total industrial output in 1998. Inefficiency of state enterprises has been said to
be a major problem in the Chinese economy. The seriousness of this problem is
exaggerated on two counts. First, productivity of state enterprises has been
steadily increasing in the last two decades, although at a slower rate than the
collective and private sectors. Second, the relative importance of the state
enterprises has been declining and the effect of the performance of the state
sector on economic growth is less important than before.
Some of the problems facing the state enterprises are similar to those facing
the banking sector. There is a shortage of competent and well-trained
managers and staff to operate a modern enterprise. There is a tendency to
make management decisions based on personal relations and for personal gain
at the expense of the enterprise. The system does not provide the management
with appropriate incentives to work for the benefit of the enterprise, including
a much lower scale of pay than in similar collective enterprises and the lack of a
suitable governance system. Many staff and workers still have the habit of the
iron rice bowl, relying on the state to guarantee their job security. In addition,
the equipment and technology of many state enterprises are antiquated. One
important condition more favorable to the reform of state enterprises than the
reform of the banking sector is the high degree of competition from collective
and foreign enterprises in both the domestic and foreign markets. Competition
has forced the state enterprises to be more efficient, but the banking sector has
been opened to competition much more slowly.
The main avenue of continued reform of state enterprises, as stated in the
report of General Secretary Jiang Zemin, is to change them to shareholding
companies. For the small and medium-sized enterprises, restructuring has
taken place whereby managers and workers purchased shares according to
their wages and members of a board of directors were elected by the
shareholders. For example if the monthly wage of a worker is 600 yuan, he or
she may pay 2000 yuan for the shares, while the high-level managers may pay
5000 to 10000 yuan for the shares. The shares can be traded among
shareholders but are not sold to the public. For large state enterprises,
restructuring takes a variety of forms but mostly the form of a shareholding
corporation. Shares can be purchased by outsiders. The shares of a minority of
state enterprises which are qualified according to their financial performance
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can be traded in the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and even the New York
Stock Exchanges according to the regulations of the respective exchanges. The
State Economic and Trade Commission and its branches at provincial, city and
county levels are given the responsibility for restructuring the state enterprises
under their jurisdiction. Effective directions on restructuring are given centrally
in Beijing at meetings involving party and government leaders of all provinces.
These officials in turn transmit the directions to lower levels in all parts of
China. As economic adviser to the Shandong Provincial government I met with
officials of the Economic and Trade Commission in Shandong on issues of
enterprise reform in 1997±1998. The high level of competence of these officials
was impressive.
To appraise the prospects of success of the current restructuring of state
enterprises in China, the following observations can be made. First, the current
effort is a continuation of a series of attempts beginning in 1979 at reforming
the state enterprises to make them financially independent, efficient and
profitable. It is an evolutionary process and dramatic results should not be
expected in a short time. Second, the success of an enterprise depends on many
factors of which its ownership and governance structure is only one. Other
important factors are the ability and resourcefulness of its managers and
workers, the particular industry it is in, the degree of competition, etc. No
matter how the corporations of a country are organized, some will make
profits while others will lose money. Restructuring cannot make all or almost
all Chinese state enterprises profitable as they are subject to competition from
collective and foreign companies. Third, on the positive side, the problems with
state enterprises are not so serious as to require immediate solution. The
government is proceeding at a deliberate speed. It is making sure that not too
many workers are laid off in any period and that the workers laid off are given
some compensation, usually equal to about one-third of their monthly wage,
and are provided with training to re-enter the job market. Fourth, also on the
positive side, by allowing foreign capital, management and technology to come
in through joint ventures and even buyouts of failing state enterprises, many
have been and will be improved in performance. In the later part of 1998 when
the Asian economic crisis continued, the privatization of state enterprises was
being slowed down for fear that the prices were too low and corrupt officials
might benefit from the sales when there was insufficient government super-
vision. In March 1998, Premier Zhu announced that the problem of state
enterprise restructuring should be completed in three years. His main targets
were to make profitable the majority of the 50 largest state enterprises which
were operating at a loss, and to restructure most small and medium-sized state
enterprises into shareholding companies. These targets appear feasible.
Two serious consequences of the failing state enterprises are the bad debts
they owe the state banks and the unemployment of laid-off workers due to
restructuring. The former problem has been discussed and is unlikely to lead to
a banking crisis. Besides the unemployment problem, some workers had their
wages reduced, possibly by 50 percent or even more. Some did not receive their
regular salaries. These problems are concentrated in provinces with a large
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number of state enterprises including the provinces in the north-east. The
national unemployment rate (excluding laid-off workers receiving partial
compensation) increased from 3.2 percent in 1996 to 4.0 percent in 1997. It was
3.2 percent in October 1998. The unemployment problem in China can be
expected to be under control for three reasons. First, as just pointed out, the
pace of enterprise restructuring will not be too rapid to create an excessive level
of unemployment. Second, the Chinese people are resourceful and the market
economy is working so that many laid-off workers have found other jobs in the
market, especially in the service sector. Third, the government is stimulating
the economy by building infrastructure at a higher rate than was previously
planned. This will create employment.
Turning to fiscal policy, Premier Zhu Rongji stated on 19 March at a press
conference held by the People's Congress that to achieve an 8 percent growth
rate the main means would be to increase domestic demands. He said: ``to
stimulate domestic demands, we will increase investment in construction of
infrastructure, such as railways, highways, agricultural land and water
conservancy facilities, municipal facilities and environmental protection
facilities. We will also increase investment in hightech industries and in the
technical renovation of existing enterprises.'' A figure quoted in the press is a
total of US$1.2 trillion of investment in the three years 1998 to 2000. If the
figure were converted to Chinese RMB by an 8 to 1 ratio, the average of 400
billion dollars per year would become 3200 billion yuan. In 1997 investment in
fixed assets increased by 9 percent in real terms to reach 2350 billion yuan. If
one allowed for an inflation rate of 3 percent and projected the 2350 figure
forward using an annual growth rate of 13 percent in money terms for three
years, the amounts of fixed investment in 1998 to 2000 would be 2656, 3000
and 3391 billion yuan, respectively. Therefore, the average of 3200 billion yuan
represents a reasonable stimulation program.
Recent economic trends suggest that China's economy continued to grow
in 1997 but the rate of growth slowed down in 1998. Industrial output grew
by 11.2 percent in real terms in 1997, with the state sector growing at only 5.5
percent but the collective and private-owned sectors growing at 11 percent
and 14 percent, respectively. In the first three months of 1998, industrial
output in constant prices still increased by 9.7 percent from the same period
of 1997, whereas the growth of real GDP during these three months was 7.2
percent, smaller than the target rate of 8 percent for 1998. In the third quarter
of 1998, real GDP grew at 7.6 percent, as compared with 6.8 percent in the
second quarter. Many infrastructure projects were under way, including the
introduction of state-of-the-art technology to agriculture, a new railway
linking the north-eastern and southern regions as a part of a planned 245
billion yuan for railway construction in the next five years, among others.
China has adopted the Keynesian way to stimulate aggregate demand by
increasing government expenditures, especially in infrastructure building.
Another component of the increase in government expenditures was due to
the severe floods in the summer of 1998 in the central and north-eastern
regions for which the government took decisive actions. Retail sales as a
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component of aggregate demand grew at an annual rate of 7 percent in the
third quarter of 1998. As of early November the government was still
expecting to achieve the target growth rate of 8 percent, or something close to
it. The growth of over 7 percent during the first three quarters was already a
remarkable achievement.
3. FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
In 1997 total exports of China amounted to 182.7 billion US dollars, about 20
percent of GDP. This figure represents an increase of 21 percent from 1996, as
compared with a growth rate of only 1.5 percent from 1995 to 1996. Imports to
China totaled 142.4 billion US dollars in 1997, resulting in a trade surplus of
40.3 billion US dollars. Total trade volume was US$325.6 billion in 1997,
about 36 percent of GDP. In March 1998 foreign trade volume was 7.9 percent
higher than a year before, with exports increasing 9.24 percent and imports
increasing 6.23 percent. However, in May 1998 exports fell by 1.5 percent,
falling for the first time in 22 months, and the January±May export growth
rate was reduced to only 8.6 per cent. By September 1998, exports were reduced
by 6.7 percent as compared with a year earlier, although the trade surplus was
maintained by the reduction of imports. As a component of aggregate demand,
exports seemed to be weakened as a result of the currency devaluation of, and
the reduced demand from, several Asian countries in financial crisis, including
Japan which is in a recession and has the value of the yen falling. While some of
the state-owned companies engaged in foreign trade are not doing well, private
and foreign-invested companies are taking an active role in promoting Chinese
exports in a variety of consumer goods to the world market. In the first four
months of 1998, foreign-invested companies exported some 42 percent of the
national total. Even if the rate of increase in the volume of exports was smaller
in 1998, the rate of growth in GDP was affected only moderately as exports
accounted for only 20 percent of GDP. (Note that in 1996 China's GDP grew
by 9.6 percent while its exports grew by only 1.5 percent.) In the meantime the
government has adopted a variety of measures to stimulate exports, including
the lowering of export duties and the refund of taxes on raw materials used to
produce exports.
In 1997 the flow of direct foreign investment continued to be strong, being
10.1 percent higher than 1996. In the first five months of 1998, foreign direct
investment fell by 1.49 percent as compared with the same period of 1997. The
trade surplus and the surplus in the capital account helped increase the amount
of foreign reserves in China by 35 billion US dollars in 1977 to 140 billion by
the end of 1997. Since China continued to have a trade surplus during the first
few months of 1998, and foreign investment continued to flow in though at a
slower rate, foreign exchange reserves should have been accumulating, but
remained approximately constant for reasons to be discussed below. At the
same time the purchasing power of the Chinese currency is strong as compared
with the US dollars at the current [1998] exchange rate of 8.3 Chinese yuan per
dollar, and China has a lower inflation rate than the United States, with retail
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prices in March 1997 1.2 percent lower than in the same period in 1997 and
nearly constant in the middle of 1998. These factors provide strong
fundamentals for the value of the Chinese currency and make its devaluation
unnecessary. Even if the trade surplus were to fall because of competition in the
world markets from Asian countries which have devalued their currencies, the
economic fundamentals and the political will of the Chinese leaders appear to
be strong enough to make devaluation of the Chinese currency unlikely. When
both President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji pronounced in early 1998
that there would not be a devaluation, they intended to have the Chinese
economy serve as a stabilizing force in the Asian financial crisis. The Chinese
economy is strong enough to play such a role.
Nevertheless, in spite of the strong fundamentals supporting the value of the
Chinese currency, many people inside and outside of China are still expecting
that the RMB will devalue against the dollar. As some Chinese citizens prefer
putting some of their money in US dollars and exporters try to retain their
foreign currency earnings abroad, China's foreign reserve increased by only 1
billion from 140 billion dollars in 1998 even when there was a trade surplus of
30 billion and an inflow of foreign investment of 27 billion. The black (free)
market rate of the RMB in Hong Kong was about 10 percent lower than the
official rate in October 1998. The government decided to impose restrictions on
the flow of foreign currency out of China. The restrictions make it more
difficult to obtain approval of legal applications for foreign exchange. The
Chinese officials claim that such restrictions only mean enforcing existing laws,
but in practice delays and inconvenience in obtaining foreign currency make
the Chinese currency less convertible and the stable official exchange rate
economically less meaningful. For similar reasons, the risks of exposure evident
in the current financial crisis would slow down the opening of the Chinese
capital account, which usually follows the opening of foreign trade
transactions.
For almost two decades continued economic growth and economic reform
have been two most important characteristics of the Chinese economy. These
characteristics persist during the Asian financial crisis. Reforms of the banking
system and of state enterprises remain two of the most important tasks of the
Chinese government. As unemployment has increased during the restructuring
of state enterprises and as export growth slows down during the financial crisis
the Chinese government is attempting to raise aggregate demand by increasing
expenditure on infrastructure building. The volume of exports continued to
expand early in 1998 but at a slower rate than in 1997, and a trade surplus
continued to exist in October 1998. Foreign capital continued to flow in,
though at a slower rate. Together with a stable price level these factors provide
the fundamentals for a strong Chinese currency. Not only the Chinese yuan is
unlikely to devalue as a result of the current Asian financial crisis; in the longer
run it may have the tendency to appreciate just as the Japanese yen appreciated
in the 1960s to the 1980s during a period of rapid economic growth and export
expansion. Combining a fairly robust domestic demand aided by substantial
government infrastructure building with a weakened demand for exports,
CHINA'S ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE CURRENT ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 105
# Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000/3d/journals/per/5-1/s165/s165.3d
China's economy was set to grow substantially in 1998 even if it did not quite
achieve the 8 percent growth target and can serve as a stabilizing force in the
current Asian economic crisis.
4. CONCLUSIONS
For economists who believe in limiting the role of government in a market
economy, the experience in China confirms the important role of the
government in carrying out economic reform and in implementing economic
policies to deal with crisis situations, the latter in developed economies as well.
To the extent that government actions are required, the competence of
government officials is an extremely important factor determining the success
of economic reform and economic policies. China has selected the best talents
to serve as government officials, the prevalence of corruption notwithstanding.
By contrast, the poor performance of Hong Kong in dealing with the financial
crisis is due to the lack of competent economic policymakers and the resulting
failure of government policies. Hong Kong has a group of dedicated and
competent government administrators headed by a very able Chief Secretary
who were reappointed in July 1997. However, top economic officials did not
have adequate training and experience in policymaking, especially in a crisis
situation, in sharp contrast with the top economic officials on the Chinese
mainland and in Taiwan where effective economic measures were taken. Also
lacking are their desire and an appropriate institutional setting to seek
professional economic advice, also in contrast with the situations on the
mainland and in Taiwan.
The Hong Kong media has correctly pointed out three aspects of
government failures. First are the unexpected changes in government policies,
both from the former nonintervention policies in a free market under colonial
rule and in the execution of short-run economic policies. Notice the
intervention in housing supply by the announcement of a substantial annual
construction of new public housing units and the sale of a large number of
existing public housing units at below market prices to specified purchasers.
The expected and actual increase in the supply of housing depressed housing
prices at an inopportune time. There was also a last-minute cancellation of an
announced land auction. Second is the failure to recognize the grave economic
situation and to take timely action. The top economic official was forecasting
at the end of March 1998 a 3.5 percent annual growth while the first quarter
of 1998 had already experienced a negative growth rate of ÿ2.5 percent.
The negative growth was probably recognized by ordinary Hong Kong citizens
and consumers. Delays in recognition led to delays in taking effective
measures.
Third is the failure to stabilize the financial market. To defend the peg of the
Hong Kong dollar, a simple and workable means was well known to be for the
Monetary Authority to make available options to buy US dollars at the official
exchange rate in the future. This would have reduced the uncertainty of people
who were concerned about a possible devaluation and decided to sell Hong
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Kong dollars. They borrowed Hong Kong dollars to buy US dollars, leading to
a significant increase in the interest rate and a reduction in business investment
and other productive activities. The reduction of productive activities was also
caused by the unpredictability of government economic policies. It contributed
to the recession in Hong Kong. A fall in real estate prices resulted from
government intervention in the market supply and uncertainties concerning
future government policies. The fall in stock prices in the summer 1998, owing
to the reduction in economic activities and the lack of business confidence,
adversely affected consumption expenditures. To be sure, the severe competi-
tion in the export markets and in the domestic tourist industry after the
devaluation of the currencies in neighboring Asian countries contributed to the
depression in Hong Kong, besides the failure of government policies. On
the positive side, Hong Kong economic officials appear to have learned from
the experience in 1997±1998. Therefore, we can expect the performance of the
officials and of the economy to improve in the future. Perhaps the failures in
economic policies were difficult to prevent as Hong Kong was changed from a
colonial rule to self government.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the Chinese experience is concerned
with the effects of an externally generated economic crisis on the progress of
economic reform. There are both positive and negative effects. On the negative
side, the speed of reform may be reduced, as evidenced by the introduction of
restrictive policies on foreign exchange transactions and on the privatization of
state enterprises. On the positive side, the crisis provides new experience to
policymakers, and new observations to economists, on the nature of desirable
institutional changes. Examples are the need to have transparencies in financial
institutions and more effective supervision of commercial banks by the central
bank. The appropriate degree to restrict international capital flows and the
appropriate speed and sequencing of trade and investment liberation have to
be studied carefully. In any case the financial crisis has led to a re-examination
of existing economic institutions and will benefit the outcome of economic
reform in the long run. When the crisis recedes, economic reform is likely to
resume its speed in China if we can judge by the history of the reform process in
the last two decades, including the resumption and speeding up of economic
reform after the political shock of Tienanmen Square in 1989. Unexpected
political and economic disturbances are bound to affect the speed and nature
of economic reform and the formulation of economic policies, in China as
elsewhere.
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